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 Everybody agrees that there are a multitude of scientific theories that are 
conceptually and explanatorily autonomous with respect to the fundamental 
concepts and fundamental explanations of foundational physical theories.  
Conceptual autonomy means that there is no plausible way to define the 
concepts of the autonomous theories in terms of the concepts that we use in our 
foundational physics.  This is so even if we allow a rather liberal notion of 
“definition” so that concepts defined as limit cases of the applicability of the 
concepts of foundational physics are still considered definable.  Explanatory 
autonomy means that there is no way of deriving the explanatory general 
principles, the laws, of the autonomous theory from the laws of foundational 
physics.  Once again this is agreed to be the case even if we use a liberal notion 
of “derivability” for the laws so that derivations that invoke limiting procedures are 
still counted as derivations. 
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 When talking about this conceptual and explanatory autonomy a theory is 
often said to be “irreducible” to foundational physics.  More problematically we 
often hear talk of the autonomous theory revealing to us that phenomena in the 
world are “emergent” relative to the phenomena characterized by fundamental 
physics.  It is probably best not to ask such questions as whether or not one 
theory is “irreducible” to another or whether or not some phenomena are 
“emergent” relative to other phenomena.  The vagueness and slipperiness of 
these terms is unhelpful.  Rather, our task is to recognize the wide variety of 
reasons why conceptual and explanatory autonomy can exist, and to carefully 
distinguish each such ground for autonomy from all the others. 
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 The most dramatic kind of autonomy we could expect would be the case 
where the autonomous theory refers to a realm of being simply unaccounted for 
in our foundational physics.  For a very long time this was the kind of autonomy 
that those who denied the universal reach of foundational physics really had in 
mind.  More often than not they claimed to descry it in the realms of life and of 
mind. 
 Divine intervention, miracles, transcendent spiritual beings and the like – 
were they to exist – would presumably be events and things whose very ontology 
leaves them outside the realm of physical explanation.  “Intelligent design” is just 
the latest sadly defensive version of such proposals. 
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 But those more “naturalistically” inclined, and dubious of the supernatural 
in its entirety might still seek some sorts of “ontological” autonomy.  Bergson and 
others posited the existence of “élan vital” or “life force” as the sine qua non of 
the possibility of biological life.  Of course as our knowledge of the molecular 
biochemistry of biological phenomena increases at an exponential rate, the 
plausibility of such views, resting upon claims that no other explanatory account 
that left vital force out could possibly do, becomes less and less plausible.  The 
one residual area where the purest kind of autonomy based upon a claim of a 
realm of ontology outside that comprehensible within physical theory is, of 
course, that of alleged directly accessible contents of sensory awareness.  
Whether we must countenance such things remains a great mystery.  And 
whether their existence, if there be such, places any sort of limits on the 
universality of our physical explanations remains an open question.  And let us 
put to the side any of the notorious attempts to show that some posited realm of 
the mental outside the realm of the physical must be taken account of in our most 
basic physical explanations when transcendent egos act on physical systems to 
collapse wave packets! 
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 In recent philosophy explanatory autonomy has been treated in greatest 
detail in proposals dealing with the so-called special science.  Put issues of 
sensory contents of mental awareness to the side.  Indeed, grant to domain of 
 4 
entities posited in fundamental physics full universality.  Still a very plausible 
case can be made out that there is a plentitude of explanatory schemes, and 
schemes of concepts needed to frame these explanations, that is not derivable 
from, or, indeed, even closely related to the conceptual and explanatory 
repertoire of physics. 
 Economics treats of prices, capital flows and monetary equilibrium.  Its 
explanations are framed in terms of market equilibria, rational expectations and 
the time value of money.  The theory of human action treats of beliefs and 
desires and explains in terms of maximizing expected utility.  Dynamic 
personality theories treat of attachment bonds, frustration and aggression and 
explain behavior in terms of psychodynamic development theories.  What do 
such concepts have to do with those such as quantum relativistic fields or with 
such explanations as unitary time translations or measurement collapses? 
 Indeed, it has often been argued that biology is replete with its particular 
set of classificatory concepts and explanatory principles, and there is a 
substantial literature devoted to convincing us that the same thing is true of 
chemistry. 
 In each case we are given arguments (of varying plausibility depending on 
the cases) that any hope of “defining” the concepts of the special science in 
terms of the concepts of fundamental physics is out of the question.  And we are 
given arguments (again of varying plausibility) that the explanatory principles of 
the special science “stand on their own” with no possibility and no need of being 
derivable in any way from the dynamical laws of physics. 
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 The central role within some such theories of such principles as rationality 
of behavior (maximizing expected utility and the like), and the justifications of 
such principles out of fundamental posits such as preference transitivity for 
lottery choices, certainly shows a conceptual and explanatory structure at the 
heart of some of these theories that seems entirely independent of the casual 
and dynamical structure of fundamental physics.  This, of course, is the modern 
day version of the traditional (Kantian) claim of autonomous realms of the rational 
(as opposed to the causal), but in an innocent version that can be claimed to 
require no mysterious posits of noumenal realms of acuasal freedom. 
 Actually the story of how the special sciences with their “autonomous” 
conceptual schemes and their “autonomous” explanatory principles relate to the 
conceptual framework and explanatory principles of fundamental physics is, 
ultimately, a very complicated tale.  Some of it has been told but much more 
needs to be done.  Too often we are presented with dramatic claims motivated 
by a kind of partisan demand for respect for a discipline as free of any need to 
bow to physics, and too little in the way of careful and detailed exploration of how 
the complicated web of the variety of sciences is actually constructed and how 
hierarchical elements (with physics at the bottom – or top? –of the hierarchy) play 
a crucial role in that construction. 
 Some basic aspects of this complicated structure are pretty easy to see, 
though.  The disciplines that seem most remote from fundamental physics in their 
conceptual and explanatory structure are often those that explore some kind of 
“functional” order in a complex system.  The system may be a society with 
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individual persons and their relations as the system whose functioning is in 
question.  Or it might be components within a single functioning individual with a 
complex inner mechanism of parts whose interactions generate the behavior of 
the individual. 
 What do we need in the way of a contribution from physics to get a system 
that constitutes an economy?  Only enough to ground a very abstract structure.  
We need notions of individuals in a society to be identifiable and reidentifiable 
over time.  We need characterizations of interactions among individuals in terms 
of “transfers” of items abstractly characterized as “signals.”  So we must 
presuppose some kind of physical medium in which the abstractly represented 
transferred things or signals must be instantiated.  Issues of a sufficiently 
complex inner nature of individuals to constitute a “memory” often play a role.  
Again we must presuppose that something in the physical makeup of the 
individuals can play this role, having itself component parts subject to change, 
persistent enough and stable enough  to constitute “records” and things of that 
sort.  But what the actual physical mechanisms are that play the role of the 
concrete realizations of the abstract components is of only the most marginal 
interest to the special science. 
 Hence, of course, all the philosophical fuss over “multiple realizability.”  A 
logic program can be realized in electron flows in silicon or water flows in a 
sufficiently complicated hydraulic system of tubes and valves.  Carbon based 
humans form economic units, but we could well imagine (and sci-fi writers have) 
an economic system of individuals wildly differently constructed. 
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 There are other cases, though, where the connection of the autonomous 
abstractly construed functional structure to the underlying physics (or at least 
chemistry) in which it is instantiated is much more to the fore.  Evolutionary 
biology with its genes, genotypes and phenotypes and with fitness and natural 
selection as its guiding explanatory principles, could, of course, be realized in 
many different physical regimes.  Indeed, the existence of such things as 
“evolutionary programming” where it is abstract programs (themselves realizable 
in multiple physical kinds of computers) that do the evolving, shows us just how 
broadly the evolutionary scheme can be applied. 
 But, of course, our deepest interest is in the evolution of the actual 
biological entities that constitute the realm of life on earth as that is that is the 
central concern of evolutionary theory in the first place.  Now the identification of 
the transmissible unit of heredity, the gene, with the specific chemical constituent 
of the cell nucleus – the DNA – is all important.  And with that comes much in 
train that explains why evolutionary theory in the abstract worked as well as it 
did, such as the now possible explanations of variation in trerms of mutation and 
chromosomal exchange mechanism and the like.  And with it comes also all the 
insights that require major changes in the orthodox evolutionary theory, such as 
maternal imprinting for example. 
 In the case of chemistry, one becomes suspicious of claims to the effect 
that the autonomous concepts and autonomous explanatory schemes of this 
science are really that autonomous at all.  Here the intimate connection between 
the chemical concepts and clearly identifiable underlying physical concepts, and 
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the close relationship of the chemical explanations to underlying patterns of 
physical explanation leads us immediately to think of the chemical concepts and 
explanations as somehow convenient ways of dealing with what is essentially 
physics and not anything like the functional social or even the biological 
sciences.  I won’t go into this now, but similar considerations will come to the 
surface shortly when we consider the issues of autonomy of concepts and 
explanations within physics. 
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 Our main concern here is the issue of conceptual and explanatory 
autonomy within physics itself.  What can this possibly mean?  Well the natural 
understanding goes something like this:  Our usual mode of explanation within 
physics is to characterize systems in terms of a limited vocabulary that picks out 
their basic dynamical states.  This would be position and momentum for classical 
dynamics, basic field variables for classical field theories, perhaps the wave 
function for quantum dynamics and the like.  Then we account for the behavior of 
systems by invoking the fundamental dynamical equations that link together 
basic dynamical states at different times (or, perhaps, at distinct spacetime 
locations). 
 But many of our explanations in physics don’t look like that.  Conceptual 
devices are invoked that don’t seem to have any direct connection to the 
framework of the basic dynamical states.  And novel explanatory patterns 
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emerge.  Some of these seem to use lawlike connections that don’t directly stem 
from the fundamental dynamical laws.  Other explanations don’t seem to have 
the standard dynamical linking of state to state as their structural framework at 
all.  How are we to understand such “autonomous” pieces of physics itself? 
 The most famous of these cases of peculiarly autonomous bits of physics 
is, of course, thermodynamics.  It is of absolutely fundamental importance within 
physics.  It is amazingly universal.  No matter what the basic entities you are 
dealing with and what their appropriate dynamics, the thermodynamical 
considerations apply.  And it is strangely autonomous.  Indeed, it would have to 
be in order to be applicable so independently of the constitution and fundamental 
dynamics of the systems to which it is applied.  In particular temperature and 
entropy seem initially to have no place in the realm of the usual dynamical state 
concepts of physics.  And the Second Law is, of course, the most notorious of 
the apparently autonomous explanatory principles of thermodynamics. 
 But, of course, thermodynamics is not as totally autonomous of dynamics 
as it first appears.  Duhem and Mach were wrong, Maxwell and Boltzmann were 
right!  Thermodynamics is situated in kinetic theory and statistical mechanics.  
From this perspective some concepts of thermodynamics and some of its basic 
laws seem very un-autonomous indeed.  Heat flow is transfer of internal energy 
and the First Law is just the conservation of energy, which is a basic feature of 
dynamics and its time translation symmetry. 
 But what about the more puzzling concepts – temperature – and, 
notoriously, entropy?  And what about the Second Law? 
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 Much of foundational statistical mechanics is an exploration of the degree 
of autonomy from dynamics that remains to thermodynamics once the statistical 
mechanical approach is adopted.  Here many questions still remain unanswered. 
 In equilibrium statistical mechanics ergodic theory can be viewed as 
seeking for the maximal degree of non-autonomy the statistical mechanic posits 
can be show to possess.  The game is peculiar from the usual point of view of 
causal-dynamical explanations.  We assume equilibrium states exist, without 
asking why or how they come into being.  We use their time invariant nature to 
demand time invariance of the statistical mechanical account of them.  Now 
comes the basic insight:  We get the statistical mechanical account of the 
equilibrium situation by positing a probability distribution over the dynamical 
micro-states of the system.  Then we calculate mean values of phase 
(dynamical) features and identify these with macro thermodynamic 
characteristics of systems.  In all of this already many conceptual issues arise 
ranging from “Why mean values?” (partly answered by thermodynamic limit 
considerations that identify these with most probable values) to important 
questions about the relation of the macro to the probabilistic-micro descriptions 
(called “analogies” by the cautious Gibbs). 
 Ergodic theory tries to ground the posit that most distinctively suggests 
autonomy for statistical mechanics, a posit of probability over initial conditions of 
systems.  From the dynamical perspective it doesn’t look like any such constraint 
on how initial states of a collection of systems ought to be distributed follows at 
all.  But in the equilibrium case ergodic theory does tell us something about how 
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the usual probabilistic over initial conditions can be integrated with the underlying 
dynamical laws:  Assume that the probability distribution over initial conditions is 
invariant in time – since, after all, we are trying to represent with the time 
invariant equilibrium state.  Then ergodic theory tells us that, given the dynamics, 
if the system is “metrically indecomposable,” then the usual probabilistic posit is 
the only one invariant in time that gives probability zero to collections of initial 
conditions given probability zero by the standard probability distribution.  Of 
course we then need to show the systems we are dealing with are metrically 
indcomposable (crudely that they have no hidden global constants of motion), 
and that requires a whole world itself of idealization.  And when we are done we 
still have two peculiar worries:  First of all, all of this is done assuming equilibrium 
to be the case and is far from the kinds of causal-dynamical accounts we usually 
think of as explanations in our fundamental dynamics.  And the “set of measure 
zero” problem remains glaringly autonomous from anything that seems to come 
from dynamics. 
 When we move to the non-equilibrium theory, the seeming autonomy of 
the needed posit of some probability distribution over initial conditions appears 
even more dramatic.  We can hope to extract information from the underlying 
dynamics of the micro components in our search for the prediction of an 
approach to equilibrium and for a derivation of some kinetic equation describing 
that approach to equilibrium that can be connected by thermodynamic analogies 
to a macroscopic equation of evolution toward equilibrium.  Indeed, it is dynamics 
when combined with facts about the constitution of our idealized systems (such 
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as being hard spheres in a box) that provides the resources for the various 
attempts at extracting a kinetic equation in non-equilibrium mechanics.  Mixing as 
a generalization of ergodicity is one such approach.  Topological approaches 
using such notions a topological entropy is another.  Still a third is the Lanford 
“rigorous derivation of the Boltzmann equation” for a system suitably idealized to 
represent a dilute gas. 
 But no resort to dynamics and composition will do by themselves to 
ground the non-equilibrium theory.  This is easily seen by the fact that both 
dynamics and composition are time-reversal invariant and the thermodynamics of 
non-equilibrium is not.  The usual addition is, of course, some probabilistic posit 
over the initial conditions of the micro components at the time a system is 
isolated for study. 
 Here a number of considerations support the contention that something 
has been added to physics that goes beyond anything contained, even implicitly, 
in the structure of the underlying dynamics of the micro components.  Some 
autonomous probabilistic posit must be made.  And any hope of some a prior 
derivation of this from non physical principles is, despite repeated confused 
assertions to the contrary, out of the picture.  Worse yet, in the non-equilibrium 
case we don’t even have the “hemi-semi-demi-quasi” derivation of the 
probabilistic posit that ergodic theory provides for us in the equilibrium case. 
 An additional problem that hasn’t received enough attention is this:  
Suppose we take for granted that we are to posit an initial probability distribution 
over the micro-states of a non-equilibrium time.  And suppose that we accept the 
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usual posit that this distribution should be uniform over a characterization of the 
micro-dynamical states in a position-momentum phase space.  We still need to 
characterize the region of the phase-space relevant to the problem at hand.  This 
is generally done by relying on our knowledge of which array of macroscopic 
parameters is sufficient to characterize the macroscopic dynamical approach to 
equilibrium of the system.  Sometimes reliance is placed upon the know 
macroscopic characterization of the equilibrium state of the system.  In other 
cases one relies on known abilities to characterize the system in its non-
equilibrium states and their changes (relying on such things as temperature and 
pressure fields, for example).  This is then combined with the idea from the 
statistical mechanical side that the thermodynamic analogies tell us that the 
macroscopic features are associated with features of the micro-states by means 
of the reduced distribution functions.  Density fields, for example, are derivable 
from one-particle distribution functions and macroscopic transport features from 
the two-particle correlation functions latent in the full probability distribution over 
microstates. 
 The crucial thing for us is the fact that we don’t seem to have any way of 
picking out the “right” ensemble to use to characterize a system from first 
principles about its constitution and its dynamics, but rely instead on what we 
know about its ability to have its state and evolution characterizable in terms of 
macroscopic features experimentally available to us in the laboratory. 
 And on top of all of this is the notorious need to posit for the Big Bang 
initial state of the universe an astonishingly low entropy initial distribution, in the 
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form of uniform space or otherwise, in order to get first a time asymmetric 
approach to equilibrium for the cosmos as a whole and then, by some means not 
yet very clear, a parallel increase of entropy in the time direction in which the 
entropy of the whole is increasing for the “branch systems” without sneaking in 
additional time asymmetric probabilistic posits. 
 The case of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics does provide us, 
though, with something quite useful for our general methodological 
considerations about how concepts and explanations can be “autonomous” even 
within physics.  There are many open questions about how to conceive correctly 
of the relation of temperature and entropy to features of the world characterized 
in the concepts of underlying fundamental dynamics and its states of systems.  
And there are certainly many open questions about how to fit thermodynamic 
explanations of the macroscopic behavior of things, and even statistical 
mechanical explanations produced to account for the thermodynamic regularities 
into the basic explanatory pattern framed by the fundamental laws of dynamics. 
 But at least we have some good idea of where the “autonomy” of 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics comes from.  Nothing in dynamics 
seems to constrain in any way how the initial conditions of a collection of systems 
will be distributed over the range of possibilities of those conditions allowable by 
the imposed constraints on the system.  But statistical mechanics does demand 
such additional constraints, framed in terms of an imposed probability distribution 
on the initial conditions.  Although we can find some degree of such constraints 
in some cases that stem from the underlying dynamics alone (ergodicity in the 
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equilibrium case, for example), it still seems as though we must posit additional 
constraints that go beyond anything given to us by the dynamical laws if we are 
to understand such bald facts about the world as the time asymmetric approach 
to equilibrium and its characterizability in macroscopic, thermodynamic terms. 
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 Recently attention has been focused on the fact that within physics we find 
conceptual schemes and explanatory patters that seem to show a kind of 
autonomy relative to the usual foundational dynamical laws.  This autonomy even 
persists if we count within the foundational concepts and laws those of 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.  Bringing these realms of physics to 
the forefront of our attention has been invaluable.  There can be no question that 
physics itself is constituted in important part by a variety of conceptualizations 
and explanatory modes that do not “reduce” in any simple-minded way to the 
concepts and explanatory patterns of the usual foundational physics. 
 There are phenomena that need to be explained that we are aware of 
from our macroscopic experience:  the existence of dispersion phenomena stable 
under gross modifications of the dispersing medium, crystallization of solids, 
recurrence of features of phase changes over a wide variety of substances and 
phase change inducing transformations, and so on. 
 The explanations we are given for these phenomena are sometimes 
couched in principles derived not from the foundational theory thought to govern 
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what is going on, but, rather, from some older “phenomenological” theory whose 
status is taken to be at best “approximative” in the light of newer science.  One 
example the essential use of geometric optics to deal with the rainbow’s stability 
over change of drop shape. 
 In other cases explanations are derived by clever applications of principles 
whose legitimacy stems from what we know empirically and phenomenologically 
about the situation in question.  For example, we know that crystals have, in fact, 
correlations among the atoms composing the crystal that extend to arbitrary great 
distances.  From this is derived the famous use of scaling principles in group 
renormalization arguments that allows us to derive essential  aspects of the 
phase change leading to crystallization.  The kind of unlimited correlational order 
hasn’t been derived from the underlying physics of the atoms, although, of 
course, that too comes into play in the explanations.  From such considerations 
also come the methods that demonstrate to us that the “universality” of phase 
change features across a wide variety of substances (crystallizations, 
ferromagnetism, etc.) follows from a few basic features of the situation such as 
the dimensionality of the system in question, the number of degrees of freedom 
of its components, and a few restrictions on the forces governing the interactions 
of the atomic components (limited range, etc.). 
 Other ingenious and elegant explanations rely on dimensional analysis.  
From a basic understanding of which physical quantities ought to be taken as 
causally relevant to some phenomenon, much can be extracted about how they 
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are relevant in a specifically functional way merely from consideration of their 
basic dimensions (length, time, etc.) and that of the phenomenon in question. 
 In all of these cases the explanatory patterns differ sufficiently from the 
familiar one of deriving the results from some solution to the fundamental 
dynamical equations, or as a limiting result of some such parametrized solution, 
that a claim of conceptual and explanatory autonomy from the foundational 
dynamics for portions of physics has clear plausibility. 
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 But what sort of “autonomy” is being exposed here?  Certainly it isn’t the 
sort that requires an extension of our ontology beyond that predicated by the 
underlying fundamental theories of the composition of systems and the dynamics 
governing the basic components.  But there doesn’t seem to be room here, 
either, for the kind of autonomy that thermodynamics and statistical mechanics 
has over the underlying dynamics either.  That autonomy as we have noted rests 
on the special consideration that the thermodynamic theories introduce a new 
element into our basic physics not present in the foundational dynamical theory, 
the probability distribution imposed on the otherwise “free” range of initial 
conditions allowed to the systems in question.  In the cases we have been 
looking at the explanatory schemes can plausibly be argued to be autonomous to 
an underlying foundational theory that includes the statistical element of 
foundational physics along with the basic dynamical theory. 
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 One can imagine autonomy within physics that has other sources.  For 
example, suppose that the behavior of a system depends not only on its internal 
constitution and the dynamics of those constituents, but on some special 
background state of affairs that imposes a regular “boundary condition” on the 
systems in question, but where the dynamics of the bounding system and even 
of its interaction with the system in question is not treated in any explicit way that 
would allow these to be considered in an approach to the problem that adverts to 
the foundational composition and dynamics.  One can imagine such a situation 
as giving rise to an autonomous “special” physics whose application was limited 
to the situations where this implicit background boundary condition held. 
 But the kinds of autonomous explanations we are considering don’t seem 
to fit that pattern either. 
 I think the gut reaction of many philosophers and scientists looking at 
these patterns of autonomous explanation will be that somehow or another the 
explanatory results in question must already reside implicitly in the foundational 
dynamics of the constituents of the system.  I don’t mean this simply in the 
ontological sense that whatever the systems do must be “supervenient” on the 
determined behavior of their components that is fixed by the underlying 
dynamics, but in the sense that there must be some way of deriving the 
explanatory pattern itself, in the intensional sense of a pattern “as we understand 
it,” from the underlying composition of the system and the dynamics of the 
components.  The same intuition holds, I think, for the alleged autonomous 
explanations of chemistry noted earlier. 
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 Now, admittedly, we are not going to find these explanations at the 
foundational level by looking at individuals solutions of the dynamical equations, 
or even at the limits of such solutions as some parameter changes.  Where will 
we find them?  Here the best I can do is arm-waving.  There are many ways of 
exploring the fundamental equations.  They have, for example, whole spaces of 
solutions and we can look at these.  In one way, of course, that is what we do in 
statistical mechanics where we propose probability distributions over the possible 
solutions.  But the spaces have topological aspects as well.  Are certain kinds of 
solutions generic, for example?  And the solution spaces can be explored for 
such issues as their stability under parameter changes.  As I said, all I can do 
here is wave my arms. 
 As I have said, I think it is a major contribution to not only philosophy of 
physics but to methodological philosophy of science to bring to our attention the 
rich realm of conceptualizations and explanations in physics that do not fit the 
orthodox pattern of stipulating initial or boundary conditions and deriving a 
solution from the fundamental dynamical laws.  What would be of tremendous 
value at this point would be some wide ranging exploration that would tell us, in 
general, what kinds of such autonomous explanatory patterns have been used in 
physics, and, more deeply, provide some understanding of how the types of such 
explanations can be understood to form a systematic family of explanatory 
schemes – if, indeed, they do. 
 And if the “gut intuition” is correct that these explanations must be 
comprehensible in terms of explanations that are formed at the level of the 
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concepts and resources of the fundamental theories of composition and 
dynamics, it would be wonderful to have some broad understanding of what the 
relevant explanatory features are at this foundational level and how in general 
they do their job of “grounding” the more phenomenological and autonomous 
explanatory structures. 
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 But there are puzzling aspects to the claim that each of these autonomous 
modes of explanation within physics ought to be grounded on some non-
autonomous structure extractable from the foundational equations. 
 After all, we all agree that disciplines such as economics, structural 
linguistics, personality dynamics, perhaps even abstract evolutionary theory all 
are genuinely explanatorily autonomous.  We don’t demand any need to find a 
structure at the level of our universal, foundational physical theory that reveals at 
the deeper level the very explanatory structure of the special science.  (Although 
we are happy in some cases, say evolutionary biology, when we can basically 
identify elements of the special science with elements characterizable at the 
more physical level – crudely, identifying genes with DNA molecules as the prime 
example.)  And in all of these cases we don’t think that the claim for autonomy 
need rest on any ontological novelty or even on some special addition to the 
basic physics such as the probability distribution over initial states that makes 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics so genuinely autonomous. 
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 But for the physics cases the intuition is strong that not only do the 
foundational laws and the facts of composition ground the higher level structures 
and their regular behavior in the sense that the latter are supervenient on the 
former, but that the “purely physical” nature of the phenomena in question – 
structural stabilities, universalities such as in phase change, and the like, 
demand that with sufficient ingenuity an explanatory structure in the sense of 
something we grasp as informative that parallels the “autonomous” explanatory 
structures must be available at the foundational level. 
 But I really don’t know how to characterize whatever good reasons for 
belief might lie behind such intuitions.  Nor do I even know what should count as 
an explanatory scheme that is characterizable as being “at the foundational 
level.”  And, of course, we are a long way from understanding just what these 
foundational level structures of explanation ought to be for all of the cases of 
autonomous explanations within physics that have been so profitably brought to 
the attention of philosophy of physics. 
